JPRI Working Paper No. The extended period in Japanese politics during which a single conservative party (i. Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP) was dominant- - what has come to be known as the "1. System"- - was virtually coterminous with the Cold War. Yoshida Shigeru (1. Free mafia papers, essays, and research papers. These results are sorted by most relevant first (ranked search). You may also sort these by color rating or essay length. Working Paper No. 83, December 2001 Kishi and Corruption: An Anatomy of the 1955 System by Richard J. Samuels The extended period in Japanese politics during which a single conservative party (i.e., the Liberal Democratic. Academia.edu is a platform for academics to share research papers. Today we've invited Australian translator and crime fiction expert Louis Bravos to join us on the site to share some of the best he's seen in Japanese crime fiction. The Japanese love to read. A. Free scarface papers, essays, and research papers. These results are sorted by most relevant first (ranked search). You may also sort these by color rating or essay length. Japanese political power.* Yoshida's preeminence and his legacy is challenged by a very different kind of conservative, Kishi Nobusuke (1. Yoshida and his disciples represented the more decorous "mainstream" of LDP hegemony and worked comfortably with the "orthodox" business community (seitoha zaikai). Kishi, by contrast, managed to maintain contacts with the mainstream while also connecting the non- zaibatsu business community and selected parts of the discredited prewar world of ultra- nationalist politicians and control bureaucrats (tosei kanryo) to the postwar conservative hegemony. The political choices of each contributed significantly and quite directly to the "structural corruption" (kozo oshoku) that came to be a central feature of Japanese politics and that sustained conservative power. Yoshida's contribution was made before the consolidation of the conservative camp, Kishi's came later. The system was not the result of their collusion, but of their vigorous political competition. Yoshida never belonged to the Liberal Democratic Party. The LDP was created by Kishi and his allies to take power away from Yoshida and to undo many of the reforms that they felt Yoshida had rashly acceded to under American pressure. Thus, it was Kishi who wove together the still disparate threads of conservatism in postwar Japan. He did not displace the Yoshida mainstream- - he widened conservative hegemony to accommodate the rest of its constituent parts. While LDP dominance would not be fully consolidated until Kishi's revisionist platform had been rejected and after the LDP had moved back to the center, Kishi made the "golden age" of the LDP possible- - above all for men like Tanaka Kakuei, who later elaborated and transformed his model of money politics, and for maverick successors like Nakasone Yasuhiro and Ozawa Ichiro, who took up his ideas for constitutional reform. Kishi Nobusuke did not dictate the final terms of the conservative project or of LDP dominance, but he contributed more than any other to its main characteristics- - both respectable and disreputable. Nakasone has identified Kishi Nobusuke as Japan's greatest postwar political leader. Reinvention and Rediscovery. Even in a Cold War world of cynical opportunism and rapidly shifting alliances, Kishi's postwar "resurrection" was remarkable. Kishi had been General Tojo's closest deputy for nearly a decade, until the fall of Saipan. Yet, in June 1. 95. U. S. Senate chamber where a decade and a half earlier a declaration of war against Japan had been approved, Vice President Richard Nixon banged the gavel to introduce Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, proclaiming him an "honored guest" who was "not only a great leader of the free world, but also a loyal and great friend of the people of the United States." Kishi responded grandiloquently, testifying to his "honor of speaking in this citadel of democracy" and his "belie(f) in the lofty principles of democracy- - in the liberty and dignity of the individual." Many friends in high places- - both Japanese and American- - had facilitated his postwar ascent to power but most important was his ability to reinvent himself. Upon his release from prison in December 1. Kishi drove directly to the Prime Minister's residence, where he met his brother, Sato Eisaku, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, literally to exchange his prison uniform for a business suit. He recalled to his biographer that more than the clothing felt odd. Strange, isn't it?" he asked his brother, "We're all democrats now."2 Kishi began building his political career long before the end of the war. He first ran for elective office in 1. Minister of Commerce and Industry. The election, under the auspices of the corporatist Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Yokusan Seiji Taisei Kyogikai- - IRAA), was minimally competitive, as two- thirds of the successful candidates had been "approved" and subsidized by the state. Future LDP leaders Hatoyama Ichiro, Kono Ichiro, and Miki Bukichi were among the eighty- five successful independent candidates, as was the future political "fixer," Sasakawa Ryoichi. The wartime campaign gave him considerable insight into the darker side of campaign financing. There were rumors that Kishi had already enriched himself and his political allies while serving as a bureaucrat in Manchuria. Connections to the opium trade through radical nationalists and to industrialists, combined with his personal control of the movement of capital in and out of the puppet state, made Kishi singularly influential- - and likely very rich. Indeed, while still in China Kishi became known for his consummate skill in laundering money. It was said that he could move as much money around as he wished "with a single telephone call," and that he did so both legally and illegally and for public and private purposes. By the time Kishi returned to Tokyo in 1. He was already the prototypical LDP political elder. In 1. 94. 4, even before the war's end, Kishi began mobilizing this network. Once it became clear to him that the IRAA program of "one party in onecountry" would not work in an environment of competing interests, he created the "Kishi New Party" (Kishi Shinto). Building upon his ties to industry- - virtually none of which were old zaibatsu affiliates- - Kishi recruited thirty- two Dietmen. It was an eclectic mixture. Some, like his future Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, were independent businessmen with whom he had collaborated in China. Others were ultranationalists who had planned the ill- fated coups d'état in 1. Standing ready to help were senior executives of the "public policy companies" that Kishi had helped to create, independent (non- zaibatsu) businesses that Kishi had helped to nurture, and a large number of small and medium- sized businesses that had profited from his wartime control program. Sorting out the Parties. The decade following the end of the war was a period of intense upheaval for Japanese political parties. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP), as the main opposition to the conservative parties, led a coalition government under Prime Minister Katayama for ten months from April 1. February 1. 94. 8. Although some small splinter groups broke off during 1. JSP remained together until October 1. Left and Right factions over the question of ratification of the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty with the United States. The Communist Party, which had done well in the 1. The conservative parties were more divided and underwent even more transformations than the Socialists. When parties were reestablished in 1. Liberals (Nihon Jiyuto), the Progressives (Nihon Shinpoto), and the Cooperative Party (Nihon Kyodoto). But their ranks were soon decimated by the purge of politicians who had ties to wartime politics. Their greatest loss was the Liberal Party leader, Hatoyama Ichiro, who was purged in 1. Liberals had become largest party in Diet. In his place, Yoshida Shigeru became party leader and prime minister. By the early 1. 95. Prime Minister Yoshida (the Liberal Party) and the Japan Reform Party (Nihon Kaishinto), but the conservative political landscape was still far from settled. Efforts to reconcile Yoshida and Hatoyama, after the latter was de- purged in 1. Yoshida refused to relinquish control of the party to Hatoyama, who had been instrumental in creating it. Prewar associations, personal enmities, and numerous debts were all in play, and no unified conservative solution seemed possible. Conservative disunity was not only personal. Much of it was substantive and policy- oriented- - and began with the Constitution itself. No politician was more outspoken and energetic on the need to revise the Constitution than Kishi. He worked relentlessly to gain political support for revision so that Japan could rearm, become an equal security partner of the United States, and enjoy an autonomous foreign policy. He captured the attention of most of Japan's postwar right when he wrote that in order for Japan to regain its status as a "respectable member (of) the community of nations it would first have to revise its constitution and rearm: If Japan is alone in renouncing war, . If, on the other hand, Japan could defend herself, there would be no further need of keeping United States garrison forces in Japan. Japan should be strong enough to defend herself."3 Kishi was determined to lead the right- wing conservatives to power, and he considered a number of routes to that end. While still in prison he developed a plan for combining right- wing Socialists and conservatives into a "popular movement of national salvation" (kukoku kokumin undo) that would serve as a large umbrella for politicians and policymakers like himself who believed in the efficacy of an activist state that, working with a mobilized populace, could define and act in the national interest. Kishi had a well- developed vision of a stable Japanese polity ruled by a dominant party. Upon his release from prison, he revived the model of his late wartime "Kishi New Party" and his prewar "Association for Defense of the Fatherland" (Gokoku Doshikai) in the form of a "Japan Reconstruction Federation" (Nippon Saiken Renmei). He built his federation party around a number of former Minseito (one of the two main prewar conservative parties) politicians and control bureaucrats, and made Shigemitsu Mamoru, the former Foreign Minister, its nominal leader. The party goals were anti- communism, promotion of small and medium- sized businesses, deepening of U. S.- Japan economic relations, and revision of the Constitution. Free scarface Essays and Papers. Your search returned 8. Next > >. These results are sorted by most relevant first (ranked search). You may also sort these by color rating.
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